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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Abstract 
Performance-based contracting (PBC) is altering the fundamental relationship 
between buyers and suppliers engaged in the support of capital-intensive systems 
such as high-speed rail, defense, and power generation.  This relationship is shifting 
from a traditional transactional-based (return on sales) business approach to a 
collaborative, performance-based (return on investment) multi-year contractual 
model.  With PBC, the supplier is compensated for system performance rather than 
for each maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) transaction.  PBC success lies in 
the incentive structure.  Under PBC supplier profits, system performance and 
operator costs are improved when smart investment decisions are made that trade 








This paper develops a decision-theoretic model that determines the optimal contract 
length and optimal investment and pricing strategies for performance-based, post-
production service contracts that simultaneously maximizes the profit to the supplier 
while satisfying the customer’s needs.  The model accounts for reliability as a 
function investment, the average and variance of the cost to perform maintenance 
tasks, and for customers’ willingness to pay for a contract depending on its length.  
Numerical examples illustrate how optimal strategies depend on potential market 
size, expected cost per failure, and on other parameters of the model. 
Introduction 
There is a noticeable paradigm shift in the contractual relationship between suppliers 
and buyers of post-production support service.  Traditionally buyers and suppliers of post-
production support for high capital intensive systems (e.g., high speed rail, defense 
systems, and power distribution systems) have tended to adopt a transactional relationship 
(Sols, Nowicki, & Verma, 2007).  This buyer-supplier strategy is being supplanted by a more 
avant garde approach where the buyer-supplier relationship is characterized by long-term 
contracts focused on delivering performance and driving out cost for the buyer while 
providing satisfactory profit margins for the supplier (Randall, Pohlen, & Hanna, 2010). 
These performance-based service contracting strategies are referred to by a number of 
names such as performance-based logistics (PBL), performance-based contracting (PBC) 
and power-by-the-hour (PBH) with a central theme of providing an incentive structure based 
on multi-year contracts and shared cost avoidance (Kim, Cohen, & Netessine, 2007). 
The traditional approach to post-production service contracts adopts a transactional 
view where a supplier’s revenue and profit is generated with each service transaction. The 
more transactions, the more revenue and the more profit.  In contrast, a performance-based 
strategy ties the supplier’s revenue stream and profit margin to both the system performance 
and the cost associated with that performance.  As costs go down, assuming performance 
within contract specification, the supplier profits increase. 
One industry in which these PBC contracts are increasing is the United States 
Department of Defense (DoD) industry.  Based upon the success of these PBC contracts 
the DoD has mandated performance-based contracting as the method of choice for post-
production support of new systems (Vitasek & Geary, 2008).  Currently the DoD is engaged 
in 76 performance-based contracts with another 95 scheduled in the near future (Geary & 
Vitasek, 2008).  PBC has also been successfully employed in the commercial sector 
including aerospace, transportation, telecommunications, and power generation industries 
(Keating & Huff, 2005).  By 2005, 50 countries were exploring or implementing performance-
based maintenance contracts (National Cooperative Research Program, 2009).  Existing 
practices in PBC proved its efficiency in terms of cost reductions and increases in system 
performance (Fowler, 2008; Kratz, 2008).  
Suppliers using the traditional, transactional-based, post-production service 
agreements have generated satisfactory profit margins.  However, this facilitates an uneasy 
economic imbalance between suppliers and customers.  Alexander, Dayal, Dempsey, and 
Ark (2002) and Bundschuh and Dezvane (2003) recognize that even though after-sales 
support using the transactional economic model is a very profitable business for the 
supplier, the supplier’s lack the financial incentive to invest in cost-avoidance strategies 
such as reliability, maintainability, and supply chain improvements.  As a natural 
consequence of a performance-based contract, the supplier is inherently incentivized to 
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invest in design and supply improvements to reduce out-year costs.  As a result, there is 
often a mutually beneficial effect with the customer’s maintenance reduced, the system’s 
operational availability increased, and the supplier’s profit margin increased (Kim et al., 
2007). 
As systems are kept in operation longer, and as support costs increase, the focus on 
performance-based sustainment strategies is likely to continue to gain momentum.  
Currently, it is commonly recognized that the operating and sustainment costs of a system 
often exceed 80% of the total life cycle cost of the system (Fabrycky & Blanchard, 1991).  
For high capital systems, these costs are substantial.  For example, the expected cost to 
sustain the Joint Strike Fighter exceeds its development and production cost by over $250 
billion (GAO, 2008).  The commercial sector is equally burdened by the cost to sustain such 
systems.  In the U.S., the airline industry spent $45 billion in 2008 on maintenance, repair, 
and overhaul (MRO), this is against a calculated $185 billion in revenue (ATA, 2008; Flint, 
2007).  These costs represent both a significant burden and a significant opportunity.  
The opportunity arises from new and innovative post-production performance-based 
service strategies that conceptualize these sustainment cost streams as investment 
opportunities for the supplier and their supply chain partners.  Customers must provide 
incentives to the suppliers for the suppliers to invest in cost-avoidance strategies.  Central to 
any successful PBC contract is establishing a long-term relationship between a supplier and 
a customer (Sanders, Locke, Moore, & Autry, 2007; Sols et al., 2007).  A supplier’s decision 
to engage in a PBC with a customer, the amount of money a supplier is going to invest into 
cost avoidance alternatives, and the price a supplier is going to charge for its post-
production services are all highly interrelated and heavily influenced by contract length.  
The following fundamental research questions are addressed in our paper.  Our 
research contact with both suppliers and buyers has showed us that these questions 
represent critical strategic decisions facing suppliers (and buyers) as they consider 
engaging in a PBC. Frequently, we have been asked to help conceptualize models that 
allow prediction of the economic viability of transitioning from a traditional to a performance-
based service contract.  That work has led us to recognize five key variables that impact the 
profitability, and investment decisions associated with a PBC.  Those variables form the 
following questions. 
Research Question 1: For a certain contract length, what is the optimal level of 
investment in cost-avoidance strategies, and what is the optimal price to charge for the post-
production support service contract for an economically mutually satisfying experience for 
both the supplier and the customer?  
Although performance-based contracting has drawn significant attention in the 
existing literature, most publications focus on qualitative research with a definite lack of 
quantitative models to assist suppliers and customers in making informed PBC decisions.  
Keating and Huff (2005) describe current practices in PBC and Kim et al. (2007) discuss 
advantages of PBC over traditional contracting.  Sols et al. (2007) uncover the key 
characteristics of successful and unsuccessful PBC and further this research through the 
formulation of multi-dimensional reward and penalty schemes (Sols, Nowicki, & Verma, 
2008).  Nowicki, Steudel, Kumar, and Verma (2006) developed inventory allocation models 
in the face of PBC.  However, none of the existing research has developed optimal 
investment and pricing strategies for performance-based contracting.  This paper bridges 
this gap.  This paper develops a decision-theoretic model that results in the optimal 
investment strategy, the optimal pricing strategy, and determines the optimal length of the 
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contract and optimal reliability of the equipment, thus maximizing the supplier’s profit and 
simultaneously satisfying the customer’s performance requirements.  
The paper is organized as follows.  The Literature Review section reviews relevant 
literature on maintenance contracting, reliability, design, and pricing.  The Model section 
develops the decision-theoretic model for performance-based contracts.  The sections 
Model Notation Assumptions and Optimization derive the optimal investment and pricing 
strategies of the supplier for a given contract length.  The Numerical Analysis section 
numerically illustrates optimal strategies and the final section concludes the paper. 
Literature Review 
This section presents a review of relevant literature on performance-based and 
traditional post-production service contracts, service pricing models, reliability, design, and 
the intersection of these relatable areas.  While performance-based, post-production service 
contracting has emerged as a successful sustainment strategy in both the defense and 
commercial sectors (Fowler, 2008; Geary & Vitasek, 2008; Keating & Huff, 2005; Kratz, 
2008), academic research in this area is only in its embryonic stage of development.  
Publications on performance-based contracting (PBC) mostly consist of guidebooks and 
good practice references found in government-issued guidebooks for suppliers (DAU, 
2005a, 2005b).  Existing PBC scholarship typically provides qualitative insight into current 
practices and implications of PBC (Kim et al., 2007; Sols et al., 2007).  
The effects of PBC on the aerospace industry are discussed by Keating and Huff 
(2005) who suggest that PBC shifted risk from the customer to the supplier. The FCS Group 
for the Office of Financial Management (2005) conducted a literature review and surveyed 
several agencies and local jurisdictions that have implemented performance-based 
contracting on the best practices and trends in performance-based contracting.  They 
identified that suppliers had a number of management issues and difficulties related to the 
implementation of performance-based contracting.  
Few quantitative models exist in the general PBC domain and include Sols et al. 
(2008) who developed an n-dimensional performance model for use in a PBL arrangement.  
Nowicki et al.'s (2006) research examines inventory allocation under a PBL contract.  Kim et 
al. (2007) developed a principle-agent model to study the implications of performance-based 
contracts by analyzing performance requirement allocation and risk sharing when a single 
customer is contracting with a collection of suppliers.  We believe our model significantly 
furthers this effort by simultaneously determining the optimal investment, contract price, and 
contract length to maximize the supplier’s profit while meeting the expectations of its 
customer base. 
The pricing of new products and services is one of the key topics in the marketing 
literature (Marn, Roegner, & Zawada, 2003; Nagle & Holden, 1994; Rao, 1984).  The most 
popular approaches to establish prices include cost-plus, return-on-investment, and 
perceived value pricing.  The cost-plus approach sets a product’s price to cover all costs 
associated with the product (Hanson, 2006), whereas return on investment pricing sets 
prices to achieve a targeted return on investment (Pride, Hughes, & Kapoor, 2008).  The 
perceived value pricing approach is the most challenging of the three.  It sets the price of a 
product according to a customer’s perception of the product’s value and requires surveying 
customers and inquiring about the maximal price that they are willing to pay for a product of 
particular quality, so called reservation price (Breidert, 2006).  Optimal pricing models 
developed in the marketing literature are mostly focused on goods rather than on services 
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and to the best of our knowledge there does not exist any model for optimal pricing of 
performance-based contracts.  
Traditional maintenance contracting has been extensively studied in the literature 
(Levery, 2002; Sherif & Smith, 1987; Stremersch, Wuyts, & Frambach, 2001), however the 
existing models for traditional maintenance contracting are inapplicable for performance-
based contracting since they do not simultaneously optimize pricing and investment 
strategies and they do not consider varying contracting periods.  Murthy and Yeung (1995) 
used a game theoretic approach to derive optimal maintenance strategies for a customer 
and an independent service provider.  They assumed that the customer determines the time 
between maintenance services and that the service provider determines the costs and the 
time to order spare parts.  Asgharizadeh and Murthy (2000) and Murthy and Asgharizadeh 
(1999) use a game theoretic approach to derive their models under an assumption that a 
customer has to choose whether to accept a contract and to pay a fixed price or to reject the 
contract and to pay a cost of repair whenever equipment fails.  The authors assumed that a 
service provider controls the price of the contract and the cost of repairs.  Jackson and 
Pascual (2008) considered pricing of maintenance service contracts and determined the 
optimal number of clients to service in order to maximize the profits of a service provider.  
Central to any performance-based contractual arrangement in order to properly 
sustain the operation of a system over time is the reliability of the system.  Reliability is a 
dimension of quality (Murthy & Blischke, 2006) and it is defined as the probability that the 
product (system) will perform its intended function for a specified time period when operating 
under normal (or stated) environmental conditions.  In the literature, the notions of reliability 
and quality are often used interchangeably.  The majority of research on investment in 
product reliability optimizes the inherent trade-off between the reliability of a product and its 
market entry timing (Lilien & Yoon, 1990).  For example, Deshmukh and Chikte (1977) 
presented a semi-Markov decision model for optimal funding of a product quality 
improvement project and time of the project termination.  The authors assumed that a profit 
from the product is a function of the final product quality developed in comparison with that 
of the competing products available in the market on that date.  Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho 
(1996) developed a multistage model of a product quality improvement process optimizing 
time to market and a performance target.  Levesque (2000) explored the effects of funding 
and its return on product quality and developed an analytical framework for optimal stopping 
rules for the development of the new product. Murthy, Rausand, and Virtanen (2009) 
developed a qualitative framework allowing manufacturers to achieve an optimal trade-off 
between an investment and the cost of consequences of inadequate product reliability.  To 
the best of our knowledge, there is no research work developing a model for reliability 
improvement in the context of performance-based contracting.  
As evident from our literature review, there is a lack of quantitative models for 
optimal investment and pricing strategies for suppliers offering performance-based contracts 
for new systems or for moving from traditional maintenance contracts to performance-based 
contracts for existing systems.  To our knowledge, our paper is the first to develop a 
decision-theoretic model that optimally determines the periodic price point of a performance-
based contract, the amount of money a supplier should invest in improving the reliability of 
the system it will contractually support, and the length of the contract between the customer 
and the supplier. 
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Suppose a supplier offers a system for sale to its addressable market M with each 
potential customer having the option to engage in a post-production service contract.  The 
salable system has an initial reliability of r0, however, the supplier has the ability to improve 
the system design by investing x toward increasing the system’s reliability according to r(x), 
where r(x) ≥ r0.  A customer purchasing the system is offered a post-production service 
contract at a fixed periodic fee p in exchange for a full complement of maintenance services.  
If the customer purchases the post-production contract, then the customer receives the 
system, with reliability r(x), and the supplier is now responsible for the costs and risks 
associated with sustaining the proper operation of the system over the length (k) of the 
contract.  A supplier’s addressable market consists of M potential customers whose 
willingness to pay the periodic fee for the post-production service contract directly depends 
on the reliability of the system r(x) and on the length of the service contract k.  Let wr(x),k(v), v 
> 0 be the probability density function of reservation fees, that is, the maximum fee that a 
customer is willing to pay for the k-period contract if the system reliability is r(x).  A customer 
buys the post-production service contract if the supplier’s actual periodic contract fee p is 
less than or equal to the customer’s reservation fee.  The fraction of the M potential 
customers that will engage in a post-production service contract of length k with the supplier 
is  
Wr, k( p) = wr(x ), k(v)
p
∞∫ dv.
    (1) 
The total profit to the supplier, assuming the supplier invests x into improving the 
reliability of its system’s design, is  
Π(x, p,k) = M 1 j(1+i)j=1
l∑ (p − f (r(x))) wr(x ), k(v)
p
∞∫ dv − x
,  (2) 
where p is a periodic contract fee, i is an interest rate, and f((r(x)) is the total cost of all 
system failures for a single period within a k-period contract given that the system has a 
reliability of r(x). 
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Model Notation and Assumptions 
Table 1 
The new, decision-theoretic post-production service model developed herein is 
greatly influenced by the reliability of the system the supplier is contracted to sustain, the 
cost to the supplier each time a maintenance action is required, the supplier’s total 
ownership cost of a system failure, and the willingness of a customer to engage in a post-
production service contract with the supplier.  Each of these variables are discussed below, 
highlighting the defining assumptions and key interrelationships: 
Notation 
Let us make the following four assumptions, denoted by (A1)-(A4):  
(A1) The system reliability r depends on cost avoidance investment x in the following 
way:  







x + γ ,   (3) 
where γ > 0 is a marginal investment parameter, defined as the marginal investment 
required to achieve an incremental improvement of system reliability. The function r(x) 
satisfies the assumption regarding the initial reliability of the equipment (r(0) = r0). The 
signoid shape of the curve r(x) describes the relationship between system reliability and 
investment observed in reality fairly well (Levesque, 2000). 
M  number of potential customers. 
k  length of a contact. 
m  number of missions in a single time period of a contract of length k. 
r0  initial reliability of the system for the mission time tm. 
r(x)  reliability of the system for a cost avoidance investment of x. 
γ  marginal investment parameter. 
f(r(x))  total cost of all system failures for a single period, given that the system has a reliability r(x). 
μc  average cost per failure. 
σc  standard deviation of the cost per failure. 
p  periodic contract fee. 
i  interest rate. 
d  discount per period expected by customers.  
λ maximal fee that customers are willing to pay for the single-period contract if r(x) = 1. 
wr(x),k  probability density function of customers reservation fees. 
Wr(x),k(p)  
fraction of customers that will engage in the k-period contract with the periodic fee 
equal to p and the reliability of the system is r(x). 
Π(x,p,k)  total profit to the supplier when investing capital x into the system reliability design for a k-period post-production contract with periodic fee p.  
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(A2) The cost per failure is a normally distributed random variable with the mean μc 
and variance σc2. 
(A3) The expected cost of all system failures per period decreases with reliability 
improvements is f (r(x)) = cm(1− r(x)) , where m is the number of missions in a single time 
period. 
(A4) The customers’ reservation fees follow the triangular distribution: 
wr(x), k(v) =
2(λ(1− d(k −1))r − p)







,  (4) 
where λ is a maximal fee that customers are willing to pay for the contract if reliability 
of the equipment will be improved to r(x) = 1 and d is a discount per period expected by 
customers if they buy a multi-period contract.  The use of a triangular distribution to 
represent reservation fees is consistent with the current state of the pricing literature 
(Kirman, Schulz, Hardle, & Werwatz, 2005). 
Optimization 
The goal of the supplier is to identify an optimal investment x*, optimal periodic 
contract fee p* and optimal contract length k* that maximize the supplier’s expected profit 
E[Π(x,p,k)] from a k-period contract (k = 1,...,n): 
E Π(x*, p*,k*)[ ]=
k=1,...,nmax
E Π(x*, p*,k)[ ]
,    (5) 
where, 
E Π(x*, p*,k*)[ ]=
{x,p}∈Fx, pmax
E Π(x, p,k)[ ]
,    (6) 
with a set of feasible solutions: 
Fx, p = {x, p} | x > 0,0 ≤ p ≤ λ)1− d(k −1))r{ }.    (7) 
where the upper bound for the price follows from triangularly distributed customers’ 
reservation prices. Under the assumptions (A1)-(A4), an expected profit is given by  
E Π(x, p,k)[ ]=
2MIk(p(x + γ) −μcm(1− ro)γ)(p(x + γ) − λDk(x + roγ))




⎩ ⎪  (8) 
where, Dk = (1 - d(k - 1)) and Ik = (1 + i - (1 + i)-k)⁄i.  
The optimal investment x* and the optimal periodic fee p* for the k-period contract 
are either critical points determined from the first order necessary conditions:  
(x*,p*,k )










∂E Π(x, p,k)[ ]
∂p = 0
,    (9) 
or belong to the boundary of the feasible set Fxp. With Equation 8, Equation 9 reduces to 
p = 2μcm(1− ro)γ + λDkX
3(X − γ(1− ro))  
and 
4MγIk(1− ro) 2(XλDk−cm(1−ro)γ) (cm(3X + 2(1− ro)γ) + XλDk) − 27 3X 2λ 2Dk 2(X + (1+ ro)γ) = 0 
where, X = x + r0γ. If (x*,p*) is a critical point it satisfies the second order sufficient 
conditions: 
(x*,p*)
2∂ E Π(x, p)[ ]
2∂ x < 0, and (x*,p*)
2∂ E Π(x, p)[ ]










∂p∂x > 0,   (11) 
The optimal solution (x*, p*) is obtained numerically for all k = 1,...,n and the optimal 
contracting period k* follows from Equation 5. 
Numerical Analysis 
This section analyzes how the optimal investment x*, optimal contract fee p*, optimal 
contract length k*, reliability r(x*), and the expected profit Π* = E[Π(x*,p*,k)] depend on 
parameters d, λ, μc, r0, M and γ.  
Suppose a supplier of airplane engines plans to introduce a performance-based 
post-production service option to a market consisting of 60 potential customers (M = 60). 
The maximal periodic fee that customers are willing to pay for the post-production 
maintenance service contract is $100,000 (λ = 100).  Customers expect a 7% discount per 
period if they subscribe to a multi-period contract (d = 0.07).  The initial reliability of the 
engines is 0.7 (r0 = 0.7) and at least a $100, 000 investment is required to improve the 
reliability of the engines up to r0 + 1/2(1 -r0) = 0.85 (γ = 100).  Let the periodic interest rate 
be equal to 5% (i = 0.05).  The expected cost per failure is $20,000 (μc=20) and the variance 
of the cost per failure is $4,000 (σc=4).  Assume that a period consists of 10 missions (m = 
10).  Table 2 summarizes the parameters considered in this example.   
Table 2. Baseline Example 
Parameter d M λ r0 γ μc σc m i 
Value  0.07 60 100 0.7 100 20 10 10 0.05 
 =
=




The optimal investment and the optimal contract fee for each k-period contract (k = 
1,...,6) are obtained from Figures 1(a) and 1(c).  The results, as illustrated through this 
example, suggest that the longer the contract length, the higher the optimal investment and 
the lower the optimal periodic contract fee.  Figures 1(b) and 1(d) show that a longer 
contract length results in a system that is delivered with a higher reliability to the customer 
and provides an even greater profit to the supplier.  Herein lies the economic win-win for 
both the supplier and customer and provides the necessary mechanisms to properly 
incentivize the supplier to invest in cost avoidance strategies.  In this example, a 6-period 
contract is best with an optimal investment of $751,302 and the optimal periodic contract fee 
is $25,602.  This contract results in reliability equal to 0.965 and the expected total profit of 
the supplier is $1,227, 210. 
  
(a) Optimal investment (x) vs contract length (k) (b) Reliability r(x) vs contract length (k) 
  
(c) Optimal contract fee (p) vs contract length (k) (d) Profit (π) vs contract length (k) 
 
Figure 1. Optimal Investment, Reliability, Periodic Contract Fee and Profit as 
Functions of Contract Length 
Parameters in Table 2 may vary due to different economic conditions.  The 
remainder of this section discusses the sensitivity of the optimal (for the considered 
example) results on the parameters of the model.  Understanding the sensitivity of these 
parameters is central to the contractual negotiation process for both the supplier and the 
customer.  Figures 2–7 show x*, p*, Π* and k* as functions of the discount per period, d; 
market size, M; customers’ willingness to pay, λ; initial reliability, r0; marginal investment 
parameter, γ; and the expected cost per failure, μc.  Table 3 summarizes how the optimal 
contract’s length depends on variations of the parameters d, M, λ, r0, γ, μc. 
Table 3. Sensitivity of the Optimal Contract’s Length on the Model Parameters 
Parameter k*=6 k*=5 k*=4 k*=3 k*=2 k*=1 No contract
d [0, 0.08] (0.08, 0.1] (0.1, 0.13] (0.13, 0.18] (0.18, 0.33] [0.33, 0.4]  
M [38, 100] [20, 38)     [0,20) 
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λ [80, 150] [60, 80]      
r0 [0.5, 0.9]       
γ [0,170) [170,380)     [380,+∞) 
μc [0, 34) [34,40)      
Optimal investment and contract length are increasing functions of the market size, 
whereas the optimal periodic contract fee is a decreasing function of the market size (see 
Figure 2).  Moreover, a certain critical market size, which depends on the contract’s length, 
is required for profitability of a contract.  For example, it is unprofitable to provide 1-period 
contracts if the potential market has less than 46 customers and it is unprofitable to provide 
6-period contracts if there are less than 14 potential customers on the market, see Figure 
3(c).  This has the following interpretation.  Customers are willing to pay higher fees as the 
reliability of engines improves.  Consequently, the supplier has to invest as much as 
possible in reliability improvement.  However, if the supplier invests large capital in reliability 
and the market size is small, the supplier may not break even.  Thus the optimal investment 
increases gradually with market size. 
   
(a) Optimal investment  (b) Optimal periodic contract fee 
    
(c) Profit     (d) Optimal contract’s length   
Figure 2. Optimal Investment, Periodic Contract Fee, Profit and Optimal 
Contract’s Length as Functions of the Market Size 
The optimal investment, the contract’s periodic fee, and length are decreasing 
functions of the discount per period expected by customers (see Figure 3).  Although, in 
general, longer contracts are more profitable, the supplier should offer shorter contracts if 
the discount per period is high. 
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(a) Optimal investment  (b) Optimal periodic contract fee 
     
(c) Profit     (d) Optimal contract’s length   
Figure 3. Optimal Investment, Periodic Contract Fee, Profit and Optimal 
Contract’s Length as Functions of the Discount Expected by Customers 
The optimal investment, periodic contract fee, and the contract’s length are 
increasing functions of the maximal price that customers are willing to pay for a single-period 
contract (see Figure 4).  In other words, the more customers are willing to pay, the higher 
fees the supplier should charge. 
The optimal investment and periodic contract fee are decreasing functions of the 
initial reliability (see Figure 5). The higher the initial reliability the less the supplier has to 








    
(a) Optimal investment  (b) Optimal periodic contract fee 
     
(c) Profit     (d) Optimal contract’s length   
Figure 5. Optimal Investment, Periodic Contract Fee, Profit and Optimal 
Contract’s Length as Functions of the Initial Reliability 
The optimal investment and periodic contract fee increase as the marginal 
investment parameter increases (see Figure 6).  However, for each contract length there 
exists a marginal investment threshold where it is unprofitable for the supplier to invest in 
reliability improvement.  For example, if γ >200, it is unprofitable to invest in reliability 
improvements for 1-period contracts and if γ >380, it is unprofitable to invest in reliability 








     
(b) Optimal investment  (c) Optimal periodic contract fee 
    
(d) Profit (e) Optimal contract’s length   
Figure 6. Optimal Investment, Periodic Contract Fee, Profit and Optimal 
Contract’s Length as Functions of the Marginal Investment Parameter 
The optimal investment and periodic contract fee are increasing functions of the 
expected cost per failure (see Figure 7).  If the cost per failure is high, the supplier needs to 
invest in reliability as much as possible in order to reduce the number of future failures and 
consequently avoid future costs.  More failures are likely to occur during longer contracts.  
Thus, the optimal contract’s length is a decreasing function of the expected cost per failure.  
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(b) Optimal investment  (c) Optimal periodic contract fee 
(d) Profit     (e) Optimal contract’s length   
Figure 7. Optimal Investment, Periodic Contract Fee, Profit and Optimal 
Contract’s Length as Functions of the Expected Cost Per Failure 
In summary, the following conclusion can be drawn:  
 The optimal investment is an increasing function of the expected cost per 
failure, the market size, and the customers’ willingness to pay, but it is a 
decreasing function of the initial reliability.  
 The optimal periodic contract fee is an increasing function of the contract’s 
length, the customers’ willingness to pay, and an expected cost per failure, 
but it is a decreasing function of the initial reliability and market size.  
 Longer post-production service contracts require higher optimal investments 
but provide higher system reliability.  
 Optimal contract length is a decreasing function of the discount per period, 
the expected cost per failure, and the marginal investment parameter, and it 
is an increasing function of the market size and the maximal price that 
customers are willing to pay for a single-period contract.  
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=





As performance-based contracts (PBC) continue to gain momentum, it is important 
for suppliers to determine the right price to charge in order to capture business to provide 
service to its own systems or other systems it is capable of sustaining.  This paper develops 
a decision-theoretic model to assist suppliers in defining their investment and pricing 
strategies for performance-based, post-production service contracts.   To our knowledge we 
are the first to develop, under a PBC, a mathematical model and corresponding solution to 
determine the optimal investment, contract price, and contract length that maximizes the 
supplier’s profit while meeting the expectations of its customer base. 
Of particular interest is gaining insight into the underlying motivation for a supplier to 
engage in a PBC with a customer, or collection of customers, or a customer’s willingness to 
enter into a PBC with a supplier.  Our findings suggest that these decisions are heavily 
influenced by the contract length, the supplier’s level of cost avoidance investment, and the 
periodic contract fee the supplier offers to its addressable market. 
Numerical examples analyze the optimal contract length, investment, system 
reliability, and optimal periodic fee with respect to the initial system reliability, customers’ 
willingness to pay, the expected cost per failure, and other parameters of the model.  The 
findings from this numerical example suggest that there is a formidable tradeoff space in 
determining, first and foremost, if a supplier should offer a PBC to its customer base, and if a 
PBC is offered what price should be offered.  The price offering is heavily influenced by the 
reliability of the system the supplier is offering to service, the length of the contract, and the 
amount of money the supplier will invest into cost avoidance strategies such as reliability 
and supply chain improvements. 
We believe this is just the beginning of an area of research that focuses on 
managerial decisions at the intersection of system design, supply chains, and sustainment.   
Cost avoidance strategies run the gambit of improving the reliability of a system to capital 
investment into spares to satisfy a customer’s requirements.   Among other research 
questions is how to optimally allocate funds among competing cost avoidance alternatives?  
As it relates to PBC, a future area of research is to determine how to invest in these 
competing and sometimes complimentary cost avoidance alternatives in order to increase 
the likelihood of contract capture and to further increase profit. 
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